NATO Needs To Re-Examine Its Mission

IN just a few days, debate will begin.

In his recent State of the Union address to the nation, President Clinton confirmed that he is about to ask the Senate's "advice and consent to make Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic the newest members of NATO."

Meanwhile, Russia fumes - and has been since these three countries were invited to apply for membership at the NATO Summit in Madrid. Why? Because NATO forces will loom closer than ever to Russia, whose western flank is no longer protected by the Warsaw Pact. Given Russia's not unjustified concerns, NATO would do well to reexamine its own mission statement before any further membership expansion.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's founding Charter clearly defines its purpose and delimits its areas of operation. The Preamble declares that "Parties to this Treaty . . . seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area (my emphasis)." Article 5 focuses on mission, emphasizing mutual defense and group response to attack against any member country, including the option of "armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area (my emphasis)"; Article 10 mandates that applicants seeking to join NATO "contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area (my emphasis)." What could be clearer?

Nevertheless, NATO, assisted by troops from Russia, has served as a surrogate U.N. multinational peacekeeping force in Bosnia even though the Adriatic Sea lapping the shore of Bosnia's Dalmatian coast is far removed from shipping lanes of the North Atlantic. And it's hard not to notice that the three ex-Warsaw pact members invited to apply for admission share a Central European geographic status - as do Romania and Slovenia (being pushed for membership by 9 of NATO's 16 members).

The implications have not been lost on Russia: this destabilizing admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic would, ironically, bolster NATO's eastern flank with the very countries that under the Warsaw Pact had helped buffer the Soviet Union against the West. Indeed, Russia can already sense acutely the forward edge of this expanded NATO, whose already strong capabilities would be augmented by 2,500 additional tanks, 700 combat aircraft, and 2,000 pieces of artillery.

Before the signing of the document allowing Russia a voice (but no vote) in NATO deliberations, press reports cited "repeated U.S. promises that Russia is not being targeted." Yet, members of Congress continue to push NATO membership for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia - ex-Soviet satellites bordering directly on Russia.

And, contemplating an expanded NATO, in August of 1996 a Rand Corporation think tank evaluated the military infrastructure of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - projecting expenses of (as reported in The Wall Street Journal) "preparing five NATO divisions and 10 fighter wings (200,000 troops and 540 planes) for swift movement eastward (my emphasis)."

Is it any wonder that Russian President Boris Yeltsin perceives an expansionist, rather than expanding, NATO?

With NATO having increasingly contravened geographical provisions of its own founding Charter, both its leadership and the Senate need to remember that the dissolution of the Soviet empire and Russian transition toward free-market democracy have been painful and often embarrassing - but presided over (so far) by the moderate voices of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Even so, political radicals Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady A. Zyuganov wait in the wings, eager to reimpose centralized communist control; military radicals like Igor Rodionov and Alexandr Lebed, grimly contrasting intended NATO expansion with the precipitous decline of their own armed forces, stand poised to reassert the influence of the Russian military.

With its unofficial "mission-creep" and looming out-of-area membership expansion triggering confusion and anxiety, it's time for NATO to invoke Article 12 of its 1949 Charter: 10 years or more from the signing of the Treaty, "the Parties shall, if any of them so request, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty" concerning not only North Atlantic area stability, but also "development of universal as well as regional arrangements . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security."

And if, on behalf of the U.N., NATO is to focus on Bosnia and other missions beyond its original mandate, then it should revise its Charter to reflect both the panoramic proactive outlook adopted in its 1991 Strategic Concept as well as a closer relationship with the U.N.

Such a transformation would necessitate a name change for this evolving Treaty Organization whose focus is no longer just the North Atlantic rim. With mission officially redefined and updated credentials presented to the world, the successor-NATO could then consider membership expansion compatible with its newly clarified goals - posing no implicit threat to an anxious and potentially unstable Russia.

Philadelphia resident Theodore L. Gaillard Jr. writes frequently on defense issues.