Boeing's hardball tactics out of place
I HAVE been following Boeing and its relationship with its two unions, the International Association of Machinists (IAM) and the Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA), for almost 35 years. What I see being played out by Boeing in recent years, and particularly this year, is both at odds with Boeing's past leadership and any sense of fair play.
One can be neutral on union-employer relations and still cringe at the agenda of Boeing's top management. Their strategy today is almost a reversal of guidelines for good labor-management relations, but it's not at odds with that of many major American corporations since the power shift in favor of business over the best interests of employees. For all of the talk about multiple stakeholders, the neoclassical economists and many corporate leaders make it very clear that the real stakeholders are top management and major stockholders, whether the latter be individuals or institutions through their pension plans.
Most of us in the labor-relations community would probably agree that the IAM had the real power vis-a-vis their represented employees. SPEEA suffered from:
Open-shop language in which those technicians and engineers who did not join SPEEA would be able to hold their jobs, as opposed to either a union shop or agency shop arrangement wherein the employee would have to join the union within a stipulated number of days after hire, or where the non-member was required to pay an agency fee in lieu of membership dues;
The tension between self-interest in economic matters and professional responsibilities, and
Strong reservations, especially by the engineering bargaining unit, against using the strike as an option. The willingness of the members of SPEEA last year to vote to affiliate with an AFL-CIO international union no doubt came in response to the fact that Boeing did not consider them as powerful as they viewed the IAM.
For at least the past 10 years, Boeing management has pressed SPEEA negotiators to give concessions regarding the proportion of pay raises that will be based on merit vs. across-the-board increases. They have implemented pay-for-performance as part of their performance-management system. In the eyes of engineers and technicians, it has meant a clearer separation of those winners (perhaps no more than 15-20 percent who will win meaningful pay increases, while perhaps the other 80 to 85 percent of both SPEEA members and non-members will either only hold their own or lose).
Such a pay system assumes fair and defendable managerial and supervisory judgments beyond the ability of most managers. It also forces managers to play God and divide the so-called wheat from the chaff. Such a pay philosophy and system is at odds with good employee-management and employee-employee relations. It is just lousy for developing high morale and teamwork among people receiving considerable differences in pay.
In my view, and one shared, I suspect, by many Boeing employees and perhaps lower managers, Boeing's present labor-relations strategy is ill-conceived, unfair and not in the long-range interests of the employer, employees and its represented unions.
Boeing plays a significantly positive role in terms of reducing our poor balance of international payments - service to the community and country - but the recent preoccupation with raising Boeing's stock price to enrich both top management and its stockholders can only come at the expense of the vast majority of its 188,000 employees. The expense to enrich the few is at too high a price for the potential cost to its employees, customers, the Seattle area, Washington state and the nation.
The top management of Boeing needs to stop its low-ball approach to its dealings with SPEEA, as well as its own employees and managers who don't agree with negotiations that are aimed at weakening or eliminating union representation for its professional and technical staff. The way for management to get the message is for all of its engineers and technicians to support the strike by not working.
If Boeing succeeds in weakening SPEEA, there is a good guess that it would then play out the hardball game on the International Association of Machinists down the road.
Finally, perhaps it's time that Boeing President Harry Stonecipher and Chairman Phil Condit retire or resign. They have done more damage to goodwill at Boeing than can be compensated by their 1999 delivery of airplane orders. Their model and strategy has been largely a disaster that its employees and the community need not put up with anymore. In my view, they lost their moorings and decent priorities and goals.
There should be consequences for their damaging actions. Their agenda has no rightful place in this community or in the United States.
Richard Peterson, a retired University of Washington professor, has worked in personnel and labor relations in the Midwest. He has advanced degrees in industrial relations from the University of Illinois and the University of Wisconsin. His opinions do not reflect his relationship with the University of Washington.