Milan cell linked to al-Qaida operatives
MILAN, Italy — Italian anti-terrorism investigators, poring over hundreds of hours of surreptitiously recorded conversations among members of Europe's most important al-Qaida outpost, say they are convinced a cell in Milan supplied false passports and other bogus documents to al-Qaida operatives who may have succeeded in entering the United States.
The absence of any apparent contact between the Milan al-Qaida operation and the Sept. 11 hijackers, who spawned their deadly plot in Hamburg, Germany, could mean that other potential al-Qaida terrorists managed to take up residence in the United States before Sept. 11 and may still be there awaiting a signal to strike.
That possibility was underscored last week when U.S. authorities confirmed the authenticity of a declaration by the chief al-Qaida spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, that the organization retains "the capability to threaten America and execute such threats."
In Washington, D.C., the FBI declined to comment on the investigations of what a spokesman called "our European partners." But after Sept. 11, U.S. officials disclosed that they were monitoring several suspected al-Qaida cells in the United States, and CBS News last week cited intelligence reports appearing to confirm that "al-Qaida is still active in the United States."
Italian investigators were understood to have flown to the United States last week to consult with their U.S. counterparts.
The overheard conversations, which took place in apartments, offices and even automobiles in and around Milan between late 1999 and the summer of 2001, include numerous discussions of false travel documents and the clandestine movement of al-Qaida fighters across international borders — the twin specialties, investigators say, of the erstwhile Milan al-Qaida base.
Although the recordings were made in 2000 and 2001, investigators said the tapes were not "translated correctly" until three months ago, after the surveillance had ended, when "we could listen again to all the most important conversations collected during the investigation."
Had the references been noted before Sept. 11, one investigator said, "We would have immediately communicated this to the FBI."
According to lengthy police reports prepared for anti-terrorism prosecutors here, the Milan operation was headed by a convicted Egyptian terrorist, Abdelkader Mahmoud Es Sayed, also known as Abu Saleh, who headed al-Qaida's documentation committee.
Abu Saleh, who was convicted of murder in absentia in the November 1997 killings of 58 foreign tourists in Luxor, Egypt, a popular sightseeing destination, reputedly enjoyed close ties to the highest levels of the al-Qaida command.
The most intriguing reference is the statement that "more than once" during the investigation, an increasingly nervous Abu Saleh was overheard expressing his intentions "to permanently leave our country," but explaining to associates "that he had been convinced to remain in Milan by an 'unspecified American man.' " Investigators said they have been unable to identify the individual to whom Abu Saleh referred.
In a conversation dated February 2001, seven months before the Sept. 11 hijackings, Abu Saleh, unaware of the microphone hidden in his Citroen ZX, mentions to a passenger that "three brothers" will soon need dual-citizenship passports, including one with both Syrian and American nationalities.
"Make sure the passports bear stamps," he admonishes the young man, a Tunisian. "The higher-ups want the job to be done properly, to make sure that they won't get caught as they reach their final destination."
Six months earlier, in August 2000, a suspected al-Qaida organizer, Abdulsalam Ali Ali Abdulrahman, paid a brief visit to Abu Saleh in Milan and was overheard referring to "some brothers who entered America thanks to a mail-order-bride magazine trick," but who "claimed to be Egyptians and kept their true identity concealed."
It was in the same conversation that Abdulrahman made several cryptic remarks about an impending attack that "will wreak such a great havoc" and "leave them all dumbfounded," comments that some have interpreted as appearing to foreshadow Sept. 11.
However, it was just two months after Abdulrahman's remarks that suspected al-Qaida terrorists in the Yemeni port of Aden detonated a bomb next to the destroyer USS Cole, killing 17.
In February 2001, Abu Saleh had a conversation with a man who answered Abdulrahman's telephone in Yemen.
"I have heard you are getting into America," Abu Saleh is heard to say.
"I'm sorry," replied the voice on the other end, "but we did not manage to get in ... ."
"How come, man?" Abu Saleh asked.
"This is our goal," the voice replied, "and we have no greater desire. ... We hope and wish to enter clandestinely by land. ... ."
Within days of that conversation, however, the electronic and physical surveillance of Abu Saleh was discontinued.
One investigator explained that, under the Italian laws, it was necessary to either stop the surveillance after one year or to notify Abu Saleh that he was the target of an anti-terrorism investigation.
Fearing that any notification would imperil a concurrent investigation of one of Abu Saleh's alleged lieutenants, the police simply turned off the microphones in Abu Saleh's house and automobile.
After Sept. 11, the law was changed to extend the prenotification period to two years.
In May 2001, less than four months before Sept. 11, the police, in what one report terms "a context of international collaboration," received information about Abu Saleh's involvement "in an unspecified 'criminal project' that had U.S. citizens or diplomats as its objectives."
Abu Saleh's role in the project, which investigators think was unrelated to Sept. 11 but may have included an alleged plot to bomb targets in France, involved supplying false identity documents.
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, Italy, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have arrested dozens of suspected al-Qaida members, including most of those recruited and organized in Italy by Abu Saleh.
In February, seven Tunisians, including Essid, were convicted in Milan of trafficking in false documents, violating immigration laws and other criminal charges.
None of those convicted or awaiting trial is cooperating with the police, sources said.
Not until several weeks after the Sept. 11 hijackings did the police finally issue a warrant for the arrest of Abu Saleh, who by then had been gone from Italy for four months.
In December, the Arab-language newspaper Al Hayat, published in London, reported that Abu Saleh had been killed "during the recent bombing of Najran in Afghanistan" by American forces.
As far as is known, however, his body has never been recovered, and one Western diplomat half-joked that he might have joined "the al-Qaida equivalent of the witness-protection program."