FAA transfers inspector tough with Alaska Air

A veteran Federal Aviation Administration inspector who clashed with his superiors by taking a tough stance with Alaska Airlines after the fatal crash of Flight 261 has been reassigned to a new job within the agency.

The ouster of Bill Whitaker as principal maintenance inspector overseeing Alaska Airlines is the latest in a line of reassignments of local FAA inspectors who held Alaska to tight standards.

Whitaker's reassignment this week comes as the Seattle-based airline is moving past special FAA scrutiny imposed on it after the January 2000 crash, leaving oversight in the hands of a well-regarded but less experienced inspector.

Senior officials in the FAA's regional office in Renton declined to discuss Whitaker's transfer, saying through a spokesman it was a "routine move."

Critics have long contended the Renton office, more so than other regional offices, has a cozy relationship with the hometown airline. Alaska is the only major carrier the office is responsible for "certifying" — that is, making certain a carrier meets federal air-worthiness regulations. Alaska also has hired away several senior FAA officials.

One of Whitaker's predecessors as a principal inspector, Mary Rose Diefenderfer, a former jet-pilot instructor, said FAA officials here reassigned her after she battled Alaska over pilot training.

During her 1998 union grievance over the transfer, fellow FAA inspector Steve Franklin testified, "My impression is that FAA management is more interested in keeping Alaska Airlines happy than they are in keeping Alaska Airlines compliant."

Other current and former FAA inspectors have complained that those deemed too tough on Alaska were reassigned. Part of the problem, these inspectors said, was a "go along, get along" culture nourished by a revolving door between supervisory personnel at Alaska and the FAA.

FAA and Alaska officials have denied the allegations.

Until this week, Whitaker, an 11-year employee of the FAA, led a team of inspectors that oversaw Alaska's maintenance. Now he will monitor other carriers that use Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. He declined comment.

His new job came after FAA officials in Washington, D.C., decided all principal inspectors must hold management rank, giving them more authority.

Whitaker, who holds a union-level rank, was not given a chance to reapply for his position, a common procedure known as a bid process. By contrast, a union employee in Dallas who was the principal maintenance inspector for Dallas-based Southwest Airlines was allowed to apply for and keep his job.

The FAA here accepted no applications for the upgraded maintenance post and gave the job to a manager in its Renton office, Tim Miller. He is respected but has far less experience than Whitaker, according to FAA sources.

The decision to put Miller in the post was made by Bob Hill, a longtime FAA official who heads the Alaska certificate office. FAA officials in Washington, D.C., approved of the decision.

Hill had clashed with Whitaker over how to review Alaska's performance in the aftermath of the crash of Flight 261.

Whitaker had just been named principal maintenance inspector, or PMI, only two weeks before the Jan. 31, 2000, crash, which killed all 88 passengers and crew members when the MD-83 plunged into the Pacific Ocean off Southern California.

According to depositions taken in November 2000 during a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation into the cause of the crash, Whitaker said he had devised a major post-crash plan to inspect Alaska's maintenance program.

Unknown to Whitaker, his bosses, including Hill, had met with senior Alaska executives weeks after the crash and discussed an unusual plan that allowed Alaska to have some employees on the inspection team. The airline could avoid fines by disclosing any violations itself. The results would be exempt from public disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act.

Whitaker angrily complained: "Why wasn't I included in this meeting? How come I don't know about this?," according to his NTSB testimony.

"I felt my position was being undermined by making deals. ... I said, 'I think maybe you've got the wrong person in this position here. I think I would like to quit.' "

Whitaker testified he was talked out of quitting by another FAA manager. But another event soon afterward revived his concerns about the FAA's treatment of Alaska.

Whitaker and Hill had not agreed on how to conduct a post-crash inspection by the time FAA officials were to meet again with Alaska in March 2000.

Whitaker testified he had asked Hill to cancel the meeting because the FAA wasn't united on the issue. Hill refused but agreed not to bring up the self-disclosure plan, Whitaker said.

Nevertheless, Hill discussed the plan at the meeting, Whitaker testified, which prompted the inspector to tell his boss, "Bob, I gotta disagree."

Right after the meeting, Whitaker testified, Hill took him aside and, referring to their military backgrounds, said, "I can have you court-martialed, or you'll be out behind the barn with me right now."

Whitaker said he replied, "I don't think at this point in time you want me out behind the barn with you, Bob."

Whitaker said he asked Hill what he meant by a court-martial, and Hill replied, "Countermanding the office manager in front of the operator (Alaska)."

"I wasn't countermanding you. ... I couldn't sit there and agree to this stuff," Whitaker said he told his superior.

Before they could resolve their conflict, the self-disclosure plan fell apart when 64 Alaska mechanics sent a letter to company officials alleging they were being pressured to cut corners.

Immediately, top FAA officials in Washington, D.C., ordered a rigorous audit of Alaska's maintenance program along the lines Whitaker had proposed.

As a result, the FAA threatened to shut down Alaska's repair facilities unless the airline revamped its maintenance programs. Alaska complied.

Whitaker also testified about another discussion in which Hill insisted that only Hill was to talk to one of Alaska's top executives. "It's just that he'll level with me and he won't with you," Whitaker quoted Hill as saying.

If the executive won't level with the principal maintenance inspector, Whitaker said he told Hill, "we've got some real serious problems here."

In Hill's interview with NTSB investigators, also in November 2000, he blamed Whitaker's unhappiness on a "total disconnect" in the office. Whitaker wasn't briefed on the self-disclosure plan because he was new to his job, Hill said.

"It shouldn't have happened that way," Hill said. "The lesson I learned there is make sure the PMI is involved from the get-go."

Contacted this week, Hill referred questions to an agency spokesman.

Whitaker's transfer has hurt morale in the FAA regional office, said one inspector, speaking on condition of anonymity. "Bill is a very straight shooter. He is very ethical and has a lot of integrity."

Sources with the FAA and NTSB said the safety board's investigators have asked questions about Whitaker's transfer but haven't begun an official inquiry.

The matter could be raised by Marion Blakey, the newly confirmed head of the FAA, who is leaving the safety board's top job and has knowledge of the Flight 261 investigation.

Steve Miletich: 206-464-3302 or smiletich@seattletimes.com.