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Thursday, September 26, 2002 - Page updated at 12:00 AM

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In their words: Quotes from Pilots, Alaska, Boeing reports

From the Air Line Pilots Association report to the NTSB on the crash of Alaska Airlines Flight 261:

• "It is apparent ... that (Alaska's) motivation for maximum income with minimum operational cost resulted in a high tolerance with regard to safety."

• "Inadequate command, control, and responsibility within the Alaska Airlines maintenance organization were ... discovered during the investigation."

• "A poignant reflection of the corporate culture is revealed by the flightcrews (sic) conversation within the cockpit during the last thirty minutes of the flight. The crew commented to each other about the pressure placed on them by the company to continue to SFO (San Francisco International Airport)."

• "The evidence clearly shows that in the years Alaska had been operating, fundamental and critical deficiencies in its systems, processes and procedures were allowed to exist" by the Federal Aviation Administration.

• "The fact that these deficiencies have existed for so long explains why the carrier had developed a culture of non-compliance with regulatory standards and best practices."

• "The NTSB's Maintenance Records Group found no data from the Alaska Airlines Reliability Analysis Program to support the escalation (of wear checks of the jackscrew assembly) ... other than the absence of any catastrophic component failures or unscheduled component removals. ... Measurements were not recorded nor were Acme screw and nut wear rates tracked. Had this been a requirement, the accelerated wear rate on the accident component could have been identified and the accident might have been avoided."

• "It is established fact that almost every commercial enterprise has some degree of inherent risks that require identification so that controllable factors related to the risks may be properly managed.... The FAA was aware of some these indicators, but attempts to regulate or control these factors did not change the basic corporate culture that had developed."

• "In a post-accident interview with (Alaska's) Director of Flight Safety, he stated, 'The role of both maintenance control and dispatch was to push aircraft. Pilots determined if the aircraft was flyable. This was the philosophy and always had been.' "

From Alaska's report:

• "Upon impact with the water, the grease present on the jackscrew would have begun to dissolve," explaining why grease was not found in critical areas of the mechanism.

• "Alaska was surprised to learn that failure of the threads on a single nut could cause a catastrophic failure of this nature."

From Boeing's report:

• "Based on factual evidence and the analytical studies ... Boeing believes that operation of the jackscrew unit ... for an extended period without adequate lubrication resulted in a high wear rate, and, combined with the operator's extended interval for (wear) inspection, resulted in loss of the acme nut threads, leading to loss of control of the airplane."

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